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EDITORIALS
THE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION AGAIN
1. The hypothetical question is ever with us. The following
recent example, contributed by an eminent psychiatrist, Dr. Harold
Hulbert, exhibits it at its worst:
"The hypothetical question was gradually designed to eliminate prejudice and at the same time to permit each opposing
counsel to introduce for consideration his viewpoint of the
evidence in whole or in part. It is appreciated by lawyers
and courts. Juries think that it is silly and that courts who
permit it, lawyers who use it, and witnesses who pretend to
learn to answer it fairly (or maybe use this mysterious method
to suppress half-truths by presenting other half-truths) must
all be silly, dumb, or smart aleck. Witnesses consider it an
archaic, awkward, and not very useful modicum for exchange
of ideas.
"Courts, Bar Associations, and legislatures might well take
under consideration both the simplification of the hypothetical
question, retaining only its merits, its usefulness, and its impartiality; and they might well also consider that it too, like
instructions, should be presented to the Court first in chambers
before being presented in public to the witness before the Court

and jury.
"An example of the heights of absurdity to which an unrestricted hypothetical question may reach is the following,
taken verbatim from a recent case in our bailiwick. The case
at issue was about the contractual competency of an old lady
who had diabetes. A quack doctor had testified that she
was too crazy to have married, but not too crazy to have
hired and paid him. That doctor had coached his lawyers in
preparing their questions which they in turn propounded to a
defense expert, a regular physician.
"Q. Now, Doctor, are you familiar with the philosophy of
heterogeneous and homogeneous evolution as applied to
the science of medicine?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever hear of it?
[517]
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No.
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Q. Do you know whether or not the internal organs reason deductively or inductively? A. That is quack medicine.
That is quack medicine?
A. Yes, sir.
Will you answer the question, do you know, or don't
you know?
A. The answer is no, I don't know.
Q. You do not know then the philosophy of heterogeneous and homogeneous evolution as applied to the
science of medicine?
A. No, no.
Q. Is it true, Doctor, from a scientific basis that one
might suffer a twenty-five per cent injury, we will say,
by way of identification, of the first joint of the thumb,
or any finger on their hand, and yet the incapacity
might be increased to seventy-five percent or more, if
you would take into consideration the heterogeneous
and homogeneous evolution as applied to that particular injury, or to the science of medicine, due to the
fact that the particular organs contained within the
human body have certain and definite functions when
they exist and stand alone as particular organs, and
when they work or operate homogeneously, that is
similarly and are thrown together for the purpose of
keeping body and soul together, have you an opinion
whether or no this is scientifically trueAtty. S: That is certainly a honey.
Mr. P: Pardon me, I had not finished.
The Witness: The question is, If you lose the loss of
your thumb,. can you think within seventy-five per
cent of normal?
Mr. P: No, that is not the question at all. Read the
the question. That is not in it. My question has nothing to do with the mentality as yet. Do not try to make
it ridiculous, Doctor.
The Judge: Read the question.
(Last question read)
Atty. S: You are making it ridiculous. If anybody in
Cristendom can tell what that question is, I would like
to hear their explanation.
The Judge: Let him finish it.
Q.
Q.
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Mr. P: Have you an opinion whether or not this is scientifically true, taking into consideration the entire membrane, in conjunction with the particular joint as
mentioned in this question?
Atty. S: Now have you finished the question?
Mr. P: Yes.
Atty. S: I object to it as absolutely unintelligible.
The Judge: Objection sustained."
2. On the other hand, the hypothetical question is often indispensable for ascertaining whether an expert's testimony is
relevant at all, as the other evidence develops:

Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Industrial Commission, filed June 9,
1933 (186 N. E. Rep. 140). The plaintiff sued for the death of her
husband, who while working in the Carbonic Company's boilerroom fell and injured his knee; some days later his knee swelled
and lamed him; on going to take a bath, he fell into the tub and
died when taken out. One physician testified that the autopsy
showed chronic myocarditis (heart disease). On the other side,
two physicians testified hypothetically that the injury to the knee,
if followed by a fever, would throw extra work on the heart,
and would thus be a cause of death. Now, says, the Court's
opinion, "The medical testimony for the plaintiff (except Dr.
C.'s) was based on the supposition that the deceased had a fever,
and that consequently a heavier burden was thrown upon the
heart . . . But there was no evidence upon which to base the
supposition that the deceased had a fever . . . Therefore the
medical testimony based upon the hypothesis that fever existed
had no value, and there was no evidence to show a causal relation
between the injury and the death."
This opinion shows how needful it may be to hypothesize;
otherwise a baseless opinion could not have been discarded.
3. How to reconcile these two opposite results? Can we
eliminate the abuses and yet retain the needful practice? Or must
we abolish the whole institution?
Let some one devise a practicable remedy.
JOHN H. WIGMORE.
PAROLE IN

NEW JERSEY

In the last number of the Journal we reported the very interesting
fact that the Board of Parole of Illinois is about to experiment with
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tables of predictability in its parole work. In other words, it intends
:o try to put selection on a scientific basis after the manner advocated
by Burgess, the Gluecks and others. We regard this as a development
well worth watching. Inadvertently, in our editorial, however, we
stated that New Jersey had already adopted the prediction system.
This was an error. Selection in New Jersey is carried out through
a classification system, the purpose of which is to make as careful
studies of individual offenders as possible. The system in that state
has been very clearly described in our Progress Number (Vol. XXIV,
May-June 1933, pp. 88-108) by Mr. Winthrop D. Lane. Mr. Lane
has, for a number of years, been Director of the Division of Parole
;n the New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies. During
this period New Jersey has developed a thorough and intensive
classification procedure based on careful studies and histories of individual prisoners and has won a position of leadership wherever
questions of parole are being considered.
ROBERT

H.

GAULT.

